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Abstract
The calibration of noise for a privacy-preserving mechanism depends on the sensitivity of
the query and the prescribed privacy level. A data steward must make the non-trivial choice
of a privacy level that balances the requirements of users and the monetary constraints of
the business entity.
We analyse roles of the sources of randomness, namely the explicit randomness induced
by the noise distribution and the implicit randomness induced by the data-generation
distribution, that are involved in the design of a privacy-preserving mechanism. The finer
analysis enables us to provide stronger privacy guarantees with quantifiable risks. Thus, we
propose privacy at risk that is a probabilistic calibration of privacy-preserving mechanisms.
We provide a composition theorem that leverages privacy at risk. We instantiate the
probabilistic calibration for the Laplace mechanism by providing analytical results.
We also propose a cost model that bridges the gap between the privacy level and the
compensation budget estimated by a GDPR compliant business entity. The convexity of
the proposed cost model leads to a unique fine-tuning of privacy level that minimises the
compensation budget. We show its effectiveness by illustrating a realistic scenario that
avoids overestimation of the compensation budget by using privacy at risk for the Laplace
mechanism. We quantitatively show that composition using the cost optimal privacy at
risk provides stronger privacy guarantee than the classical advanced composition.
1. Introduction
Dwork et al. Dwork et al. (2014) quantify the privacy level ε in ε-differential privacy as an
upper bound on the worst-case privacy loss incurred by a privacy-preserving mechanism.
Generally, a privacy-preserving mechanism perturbs the results by adding the calibrated
amount of random noise to them. The calibration of noise depends on the sensitivity of the
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query and the specified privacy level. In a real-world setting, a data steward must specify
a privacy level that balances the requirements of the users and monetary constraints of
the business entity. Garfinkel et al. Garfinkel et al. (2018) report the issues in deploying
differential privacy as the privacy definition by the US census bureau. They highlight the
lack of analytical methods to choose the privacy level. They also report empirical studies
that show the loss in utility due to the application of privacy-preserving mechanisms.
We address the dilemma of a data steward in two ways. Firstly, we propose a probabilis-
tic quantification of privacy levels. Probabilistic quantification of privacy levels provides a
data steward a way to take quantified risks under the desired utility of the data. We refer
to the probabilistic quantification as privacy at risk. We also derive a composition theorem
that leverages privacy at risk. Secondly, we propose a cost model that links the privacy level
to a monetary budget. This cost model helps the data steward to choose the privacy level
constrained on the estimated budget and vice versa. Convexity of the proposed cost model
ensures the existence of a unique privacy at risk that would minimise the budget. We show
that the composition with an optimal privacy at risk provides stronger privacy guarantees
than the traditional advanced composition Dwork et al. (2014). In the end, we illustrate
a realistic scenario that exemplifies how the data steward can avoid overestimation of the
budget by using the proposed cost model by using privacy at risk.
The probabilistic quantification of privacy levels depends on two sources of randomness:
the explicit randomness induced by the noise distribution and the implicit randomness in-
duced by the data-generation distribution. Often, these two sources are coupled with each
other. We require analytical forms of both sources of randomness as well as an analytical
representation of the query to derive a privacy guarantee. Computing the probabilistic
quantification is generally a challenging task. Although we find multiple probabilistic pri-
vacy definitions in the literature Machanavajjhala et al. (2008); Hall et al. (2012), we are
missing analytical quantification bridging the randomness and privacy level of a privacy-
preserving mechanism. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to analytically derive
such a probabilistic quantification, namely privacy at risk, for the widely used Laplace
mechanism Dwork et al. (2006b). We also derive a composition theorem with privacy at
risk. It is a special case of the advanced composition theorem Dwork et al. (2014) that
deals with a sequential and adaptive use of privacy-preserving mechanisms. We work on a
simpler model independent evaluations used in the basic composition theorem Dwork et al.
(2014).
The privacy level proposed by the differential privacy framework is too abstract a quan-
tity to be integrated in a business setting. We propose a cost model that maps the privacy
level to a monetary budget. The corresponding cost model for the probabilistic quantifica-
tion of privacy levels is a convex function of the privacy level. Hence, it leads to a unique
probabilistic privacy level that minimises the cost. We illustrate a realistic scenario in a
GDPR compliant business entity that needs an estimation of the compensation budget that
it needs to pay to stakeholders in the unfortunate event of a personal data breach. The
illustration shows that the use of probabilistic privacy levels avoids overestimation of the
compensation budget without sacrificing utility.
In this work, we comparatively evaluate the privacy guarantees using privacy at risk
of using Laplace mechanism. We quantitatively compare the composition under the opti-
mal privacy at risk, which is estimated using the cost model, with traditional composition
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mechanisms - the basic composition and advanced mechanism Dwork et al. (2014). We ob-
serve that it gives stronger privacy guarantees than the ones by the advanced composition
without sacrificing on the utility of the mechanism.
In conclusion, benefits of the probabilistic quantification i.e. the privacy at risk are
twofold. It not only quantifies the privacy level for a given privacy-preserving mechanism
but also facilitates decision-making in problems that focus on the privacy-utility trade-off
and the compensation budget minimisation.
2. Background
We consider a universe of datasets D. We explicitly mention when we consider that the
datasets are sampled from a data-generation distribution G with support D. Two datasets
of equal cardinality x and y are said to be neighbouring datasets if they differ in one data
point. A pair of neighbouring datasets is denoted by x ∼ y. In this work, we focus on a
specific class of queries called numeric queries. A numeric query f is a function that maps
a dataset into a real-valued vector, i.e. f : D → Rk. For instance, a sum query returns the
sum of the values in a dataset.
In order to achieve a privacy guarantee, a privacy-preserving mechanism, or mechanism
in short, is a randomised algorithm, that adds noise to the query from a given family of
distributions. Thus, a privacy-preserving mechanism of a given family, M(f,Θ), for the
query f and the set of parameters Θ of the given noise distribution, is a function that
maps a dataset into a real vector, i.e. M(f,Θ) : D → Rk. We denote a privacy-preserving
mechanism as M, when the query and the parameters are clear from the context.
Definition 1 [Differential Privacy Dwork et al. (2014).] A privacy-preserving mech-
anism M, equipped with a query f and with parameters Θ, is (ε, δ)-differentially private if
for all Z ⊆ Range(M) and x, y ∈ D such that x ∼ y:
P(M(f,Θ)(x) ∈ Z) ≤ eεP(M(f,Θ)(y) ∈ Z) + δ
(ε, 0)-differentially private mechanism is ubiquitously called as ε-differentially private.
A privacy-preserving mechanism provides perfect privacy if it yields indistinguishable
outputs for all neighbouring input datasets. The privacy level ε quantifies the privacy
guarantee provided by ε-differential privacy. For a given query, the smaller the value of the
ε, the qualitatively higher is the privacy. A randomised algorithm that is ε-differentially
private is also ε′-differential private for any ε′ > ε.
In order to satisfy ε-differential privacy, the parameters of a privacy-preserving mecha-
nism requires a calculated calibration. The amount of noise required to achieve a specified
privacy level depends on the query. If the output of the query does not change drastically
for two neighbouring datasets, then small amount of noise is required to achieve a given
privacy level. The measure of such fluctuations is called the sensitivity of the query. The
parameters of a privacy-preserving mechanism are calibrated using the sensitivity of the
query that quantifies the smoothness of a numeric query.
Definition 2 [Sensitivity.] The sensitivity of a query f : D → Rk is defined as
∆f , max
x,y∈D
x∼y
‖f(x)− f(y)‖1.
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The Laplace mechanism is a privacy-preserving mechanism that adds scaled noise sam-
pled from a calibrated Laplace distribution to the numeric query.
Definition 3 [Papoulis and Pillai (2002)] The Laplace distribution with mean zero and
scale b > 0 is a probability distribution with probability density function
Lap(b) ,
1
2b
exp (−|x|
b
),
where x ∈ R. We write Lap(b) to denote a random variable X ∼ Lap(b)
Definition 4 [Laplace Mechanism Dwork et al. (2006b).] Given any function f :
D → Rk and any x ∈ D, the Laplace Mechanism is defined as
L∆fε (x) ,M
(
f,
∆f
ε
)
(x) = f(x) + (L1, ..., Lk),
where Li is drawn from Lap
(
∆f
ε
)
and added to the ith component of f(x).
Theorem 5 Dwork et al. (2006b) The Laplace mechanism, L∆fε0 , is ε0-differentially pri-
vate.
3. Privacy at Risk: A Probabilistic Quantification of Randomness
The parameters of a privacy-preserving mechanism are calibrated using the privacy level
and the sensitivity of the query. A data steward needs to choose appropriate privacy level
for practical implementation. Lee et al. Lee and Clifton (2011) show that the choice of an
actual privacy level by a data steward in regard to her business requirements is a non-trivial
task. Recall that the privacy level in the definition of differential privacy corresponds to
the worst case privacy loss. Business users are however used to taking and managing risks,
if the risks can be quantified. For instance, Jorion Jorion (2000) defines Value at Risk that
is used by risk analysts to quantify the loss in investments for a given portfolio and an
acceptable confidence bound. Motivated by the formulation of Value at Risk, we propose to
use the use of probabilistic privacy level. It provides us a finer tuning of an ε0-differentially
private privacy-preserving mechanism for a specified risk γ.
Definition 6 [Privacy at Risk.] For a given data generating distribution G, a privacy-
preserving mechanism M, equipped with a query f and with parameters Θ, satisfies ε-
differential privacy with a privacy at risk 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, if for all Z ⊆ Range(M) and x, y
sampled from G such that x ∼ y:
P
[∣∣∣∣ln P(M(f,Θ)(x) ∈ Z)P(M(f,Θ)(y) ∈ Z)
∣∣∣∣ > ε
]
≤ γ, (1)
where the outer probability is calculated with respect to the probability space Range(M◦ G)
obtained by applying the privacy-preserving mechanism M on the data-generation distribu-
tion G.
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If a privacy-preserving mechanism is ε0-differentially private for a given query f and
parameters Θ, for any privacy level ε ≥ ε0, privacy at risk is 0. Our interest is to quantify
the risk γ with which ε0-differentially private privacy-preserving mechanism also satisfies a
stronger ε-differential privacy, i.e. ε < ε0.
Unifying Probabilistic and Random Differential Privacy. Interestingly, Equa-
tion 1 unifies the notions of probabilistic differential privacy and random differential pri-
vacy by accounting for both sources of randomness in a privacy-preserving mechanism.
Machanavajjhala et al. Machanavajjhala et al. (2008) define probabilistic differential privacy
that incorporates the explicit randomness of the noise distribution of the privacy-preserving
mechanism whereas Hall et al. Hall et al. (2012) define random differential privacy that in-
corporates the implicit randomness of the data-generation distribution. In probabilistic
differential privacy, the outer probability is computed over the sample space of Range(M)
and all datasets are equally probable.
3.1 Composition theorem
Application of ε-differential privacy to many real-world problem suffers from the degrada-
tion of privacy guarantee, i.e. privacy level, over the composition. The basic composition
theorem Dwork et al. (2014) dictates that the privacy guarantee degrades linear in the num-
ber of evaluations of the mechanism. Advanced composition theorem Dwork et al. (2014)
provides a finer analysis of the privacy loss over multiple evaluations and provides a square
root dependence on the the number of evaluations. In this section, we provide the compo-
sition theorem for privacy at risk.
Definition 7 [Privacy loss random variable.] For a privacy-preserving mechanism
M : D → R and two neighbouring datasets x, y ∈ D, the privacy loss random variable C
takes a value r ∈ R
C , ln P(M(x))
P(M(y))
Lemma 8 If a privacy-preserving mechanism M satisfies ε0 differential privacy, then
P[|C| ≤ ε0] = 1
Theorem 9 For all ε0, ε, γ, δ > 0, the class of ε0-differentially private mechanisms, which
satisfy (ε, γ)-privacy at risk, are (ε′, δ)-differential privacy under n-fold composition where
ε′ = ε0
√
2n ln
1
δ
+ nµ
where, µ = [γε(eε − 1) + (1− γ)ε0(eε0 − 1)]
Proof Let, M1...n : D → R1 × R2 × ... × Rn denote the n-fold composition of privacy-
preserving mechanisms {Mi : D → Ri}ni=1. Each ε0-differentially private Mi also satisfies
(ε, γ)-privacy at risk for some ε ≤ ε0 and appropriately computer γ. Consider any two
neighbouring datasets x, y ∈ D. Let,
B = {(r1, ..., rn)|
n∧
i=1
P(Mi(x) = ri)
P(Mi(y) = ri) > e
ε}
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Using the technique in (Dwork et al., 2014, Theorem 3.20), it suffices to show that P(M1...n(x) ∈
B) ≤ δ.
Consider,
ln
P(M1...n(x) = (r1, ..., rn))
P(M1...n(y) = (r1, ..., rn))
= ln
n∏
i=1
P(Mi(x) = ri)
P(Mi(y) = ri)
=
n∑
i=1
ln
P(Mi(x) = ri)
P(Mi(y) = ri) =
n∑
i=1
Ci (2)
where Ci in the last line denotes privacy loss random variable related Mi.
Consider, an ε-differentially private mechanismMε and ε0-differentially private mecha-
nism Mε0 . Let Mε0 satisfy (ε, γ)-privacy at risk for ε ≤ ε0 and appropriately computed γ.
Each Mi can be simulated as the mechanism Mε with probability γ and the mechanism
Mε0 otherwise. Therefore, privacy loss random variable for each mechanism Mi can be
written as
Ci = γCiε + (1− γ)Ciε0
where, Ciε denotes the privacy loss random variable associated with the mechanismMε and
Ciε0 denotes the privacy loss random variable associated with the mechanism Mε0 . Using
(Dwork et al., 2014, Lemma 3.18), we can bound the mean of every privacy loss random
variable as,
µ , E[Ci] ≤ [γε(eε − 1) + (1− γ)ε0(eε0 − 1)]
We have a collection of n independent privacy random variables Cis such that P [|Ci| ≤ ε0] =
1. Using Hoeffding’s bound Hoeffding (1994) on the sample mean for any β > 0,
P
[
1
n
∑
i
Ci ≥ E[Ci] + β
]
≤ exp
(
−nβ
2
2ε20
)
Rearranging the inequality by renaming the upper bound on the probability as δ, we get,
P
[∑
i
Ci ≥ nµ+ ε0
√
2n ln
1
δ
]
≤ δ
Theorem 9 is an analogue, in the privacy at risk setting, of the advanced composition of
differential privacy (Dwork et al., 2014, Theorem 3.20) under a constraint of independent
evaluations. Note that, if one takes γ = 0, then we obtain the exact same formula as
in (Dwork et al., 2014, Theorem 3.20). It provides a sanity check for the consistency of
composition using privacy at risk.
In fact, if we consider both sources of randomness, the expected value of loss function
must be computed by using the law of total expectation.
E[C] = Ex,y∼G[E[C]|x, y]
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Therefore, the exact computation of privacy guarantees after the composition requires access
to the data-generation distribution. We assume a uniform data-generation distribution
while proving Theorem 9. We can obtain better and finer privacy guarantees accounting
for data-generation distribution, which we keep as a future work.
4. Privacy at Risk for Laplace Mechanism
In this section, we instantiate privacy at risk for the Laplace mechanism for three cases:
two cases involving two sources of randomness and third case involving the coupled effect.
Three different cases correspond to three different interpretations of the confidence level,
represented by the parameter γ, corresponding to three interpretation of the support of the
outer probability in Definition 6. In order to highlight this nuance, we denote the confidence
levels corresponding to the three cases and their three sources of randomness as γ1, γ2 and
γ3, respectively.
4.1 The Case of Explicit Randomness
In this section, we study the effect of the explicit randomness induced by the noise sampled
from Laplacian distribution. We provide a probabilistic quantification for fine tuning for the
Laplace mechanism. We fine-tune the privacy level for a specified risk under by assuming
that the sensitivity of the query is known a priori.
For a Laplace mechanism L∆fε0 calibrated with sensitivity ∆f and privacy level ε0, we
present the analytical formula relating privacy level ε and the risk γ1 in Theorem 10. The
proof is available in Appendix A.
Theorem 10 The risk γ1 ∈ [0, 1] with which a Laplace Mechanism L∆fε0 , for a numeric
query f : D → Rk satisfies a privacy level ε ≥ 0 is given by
γ1 =
P(T ≤ ε)
P(T ≤ ε0) , (3)
where T is a random variable that follows a distribution with the following density function.
PT (t) =
21−ktk−
1
2Kk− 1
2
(t)ε0√
2piΓ(k)∆f
where Kn− 1
2
is the Bessel function of second kind.
Figure 1a shows the plot of the privacy level against risk for different values of k and
for a Laplace mechanism L1.01.0. As the value of k increases, the amount of noise added in
the output of numeric query increases. Therefore, for a specified privacy level, the privacy
at risk level increases with the value of k.
The analytical formula representing γ1 as a function of ε is bijective. We need to invert
it to obtain the privacy level ε for a privacy at risk γ1. However the analytical closed form
for such an inverse function is not explicit. We use a numerical approach to compute privacy
level for a given privacy at risk from the analytical formula of Theorem 10.
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Figure 1: Privacy level ε for varying privacy at risk γ1 for
Laplace mechanism L1.0ε0 . In Figure 1a, we use ε0 = 1.0
and different values of k. In Figure 1b, for k = 1 and
different values of ε0.
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Figure 2: Number of samples n
for varying privacy at risk γ2 for
different error parameter ρ.
Result for a Real-valued Query. For the case k = 1, the analytical derivation is
fairly straightforward. In this case, we obtain an invertible closed-form of a privacy level
for a specified risk. It is presented in Equation 4.
ε = ln
(
1
1− γ1(1− e−ε0)
)
(4)
Remarks on ε0. For k = 1, Figure 1b shows the plot of privacy at risk level ε
versus privacy at risk γ1 for the Laplace mechanism L1.0ε0 . As the value of ε0 increases, the
probability of Laplace mechanism generating higher value of noise reduces. Therefore, for
a fixed privacy level, privacy at risk increases with the value of ε0. The same observation
is made for k > 1.
4.2 The Case of Implicit Randomness
In this section, we study the effect of the implicit randomness induced by the data-generation
distribution to provide a fine tuning for the Laplace mechanism. We fine-tune the risk for
a specified privacy level without assuming that the sensitivity of the query.
If one takes into account randomness induced by the data-generation distribution, all
pairs of neighbouring datasets are not equally probable. This leads to estimation of sensitiv-
ity of a query for a specified data-generation distribution. If we have access to an analytical
form of the data-generation distribution and to the query, we could analytically derive the
sensitivity distribution for the query. In general, we have access to the datasets, but not
the data-generation distribution that generates them. We, therefore, statistically estimate
sensitivity by constructing an empirical distribution. We call the sensitivity value obtained
for a specified risk from the empirical cumulative distribution of sensitivity the sampled sen-
sitivity (Definition 12). However, the value of sampled sensitivity is simply an estimate of
the sensitivity for a specified risk. In order to capture this additional uncertainty introduced
by the estimation from the empirical sensitivity distribution rather than the true unknown
distribution, we compute a lower bound on the accuracy of this estimation. This lower
bound yields a probabilistic lower bound on the specified risk. We refer to it as empirical
risk. For a specified absolute risk γ2, we denote by γˆ2 corresponding empirical risk.
8
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For the Laplace mechanism L∆Sfε calibrated with sampled sensitivity ∆Sf and privacy
level ε, we evaluate the empirical risk γˆ2. We present the result in Theorem 11. The proof
is available in Appendix B.
Theorem 11 Analytical bound on the empirical risk, γˆ2, for Laplace mechanism L
∆Sf
ε with
privacy level ε and sampled sensitivity ∆Sf for a query f : D → Rk is
γˆ2 ≥ γ2(1− 2e−2ρ2n) (5)
where n is the number of samples used for estimation of the sampled sensitivity and ρ is the
accuracy parameter. γ2 denotes the specified absolute risk.
The error parameter ρ controls the closeness between the empirical cumulative distri-
bution of the sensitivity to the true cumulative distribution of the sensitivity. Lower the
value of the error, closer is the empirical cumulative distribution to the true cumulative
distribution. Figure 2 shows the plot of number of samples as a function of the privacy at
risk and the error parameter. Naturally, we require higher number of samples in order to
have lower error rate. The number of samples reduces as the privacy at risk increases. The
lower risk demands precision in the estimated sampled sensitivity, which in turn requires
larger number of samples.
Let, G denotes the data-generation distribution, either known apriori or constructed by
subsampling the available data. We adopt the procedure of Rubinstein and Alda` (2017) to
sample two neighbouring datasets with p data points each. We sample p − 1 data points
from G that are common to both of these datasets and later two more data points. From
those two points, we allot one data point to each of the two datasets.
Let, Sf = ‖f(x) − f(y)‖1 denotes the sensitivity random variable for a given query f ,
where x and y are two neighbouring datasets sampled from G. Using n pairs of neighbouring
datasets sampled from G, we construct the empirical cumulative distribution, Fn, for the
sensitivity random variable.
Definition 12 For a given query f and for a specified risk γ2, sampled sensitivity, ∆Sf ,
is defined as the value of sensitivity random variable that is estimated using its empirical
cumulative distribution function, Fn, constructed using n pairs of neighbouring datasets
sampled from the data-generation distribution G.
∆Sf , F
−1
n (γ2)
If we knew analytical form of the data generation distribution, we could analytically
derive the cumulative distribution function of the sensitivity, F , and find the sensitivity of
the query as ∆f = F
−1(1). Therefore, in order to have the sampled sensitivity close to
the sensitivity of the query, we require the empirical cumulative distributions to be close to
the cumulative distribution of the sensitivity. We use this insight to derive the analytical
bound in the Theorem 11.
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Figure 3: Dependence of error and number of samples on the privacy at risk for Laplace
mechanism L∆Sf1.0 . For the figure on the left hand side, we fix the number of samples to
10000. For the Figure 3b we fix the error parameter to 0.01.
4.3 The Case of Explicit and Implicit Randomness
In this section, we study the combined effect of both explicit randomness induced by the
noise distribution and implicit randomness in the data-generation distribution respectively.
We do not assume the knowledge of the sensitivity of the query.
We estimate sensitivity using the empirical cumulative distribution of sensitivity. We
construct the empirical distribution over the sensitivities using the sampling technique pre-
sented in the earlier case. Since we use the sampled sensitivity (Definition 12) to calibrate
the Laplace mechanism, we estimate the empirical risk γˆ3.
For Laplace mechanism L∆Sfε0 calibrated with sampled sensitivity ∆Sf and privacy level
ε0, we present the analytical bound on the empirical sensitivity γˆ3 in Theorem 13 with proof
in the Appendix C.
Theorem 13 Analytical bound on the empirical risk γˆ3 ∈ [0, 1] to achieve a privacy level
ε > 0 for Laplace mechanism L∆Sfε0 with sampled sensitivity ∆Sf of a query f : D → Rk is
γˆ3 ≥ γ3(1− 2e−2ρ2n) (6)
where n is the number of samples used for estimating the sensitivity, ρ is the accuracy
parameter. γ3 denotes the specified absolute risk.
The error parameter ρ controls the closeness between the empirical cumulative distri-
bution of the sensitivity to the true cumulative distribution of the sensitivity. Figure 3
shows the dependence of the error parameter on the number of samples. In Figure 3a,
we observe that the for a fixed number of samples and a privacy level, the privacy at risk
decreases with the value of error parameter. For a fixed number of samples, smaller values
of the error parameter reduce the probability of similarity between the empirical cumulative
distribution of sensitivity and the true cumulative distribution. Therefore, we observe the
10
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reduction in the risk for a fixed privacy level. In Figure 3b, we observe that for a fixed value
of error parameter and a fixed level of privacy level, the risk increases with the number of
samples. For a fixed value of the error parameter, larger values of the sample size increase
the probability of similarity between the empirical cumulative distribution of sensitivity and
the true cumulative distribution. Therefore, we observe the increase in the risk for a fixed
privacy level.
Effect of the consideration of implicit and explicit randomness is evident in the analytical
expression for γ3 in Equation 7. Proof is available in Appendix C. The privacy at risk is
composed of two factors whereas the second term is a privacy at risk that accounts for
inherent randomness. The first term takes into account the implicit randomness of the
Laplace distribution along with a coupling coefficient η. We define η as the ratio of the true
sensitivity of the query to its sampled sensitivity.
γ3 ,
P(T ≤ ε)
P(T ≤ ηε0) · γ2 (7)
5. Minimising Compensation Budget for Privacy at Risk
Many service providers collect users’ data to enhance user experience. In order to avoid
misuse of this data, we require a legal framework that not only limits the use of the collected
data but also proposes reparative measures in case of a data leak. General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR)1 is such a legal framework.
Section 82 in GDPR states that any person who suffers from material or non-material
damage as a result of a personal data breach has the right to demand compensation from
the data processor. Therefore, every GDPR compliant business entity that either holds or
processes personal data needs to secure a certain budget in the worst case scenario of the
personal data breach. In order to reduce the risk of such an unfortunate event, the business
entity may use privacy-preserving mechanisms that provide provable privacy guarantees
while publishing their results. In order to calculate the compensation budget for a business
entity, we devise a cost model that maps the privacy guarantees provided by differential
privacy and privacy at risk to monetary costs. The discussions demonstrate the usefulness
of probabilistic quantification of differential privacy in a business setting.
5.1 Cost Model for Differential Privacy.
Let E be the compensation budget that a business entity has to pay to every stakeholder
in case of a personal data breach when the data is processed without any provable privacy
guarantees. Let Edpε be the compensation budget that a business entity has to pay to
every stakeholder in case of a personal data breach when the data is processed with privacy
guarantees in terms of ε-differential privacy.
Privacy level, ε, in ε-differential privacy is the quantifier of indistinguishability of the
outputs of a privacy-preserving mechanism when two neighbouring datasets are provided
as inputs. When the privacy level is zero, the privacy-preserving mechanism outputs all
results with equal probability. The indistinguishability reduces with increase in the privacy
level. Thus, privacy level of zero bears the lowest risk of personal data breach and the
1. https://eugdpr.org/
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risk increases with the privacy level. Edpε needs to be commensurate to such a risk and,
therefore, it needs to satisfy the following constraints.
1. For all ε ∈ R≥0, Edpε ≤ E.
2. Edpε is a monotonically increasing function of ε.
3. As ε → 0, Edpε → Emin where Emin is the unavoidable cost that business entity
might need to pay in case of personal data breach even after the privacy measures are
employed.
4. As ε→∞, Edpε → E.
There are various functions that satisfy these constraints. In absence of any further
constraints, we model Edpε as defined in Equation 8.
Edpε , Emin + Ee
− c
ε (8)
Edpε has two parameters, namely c > 0 and Emin ≥ 0. c controls the rate of change in the
cost as the privacy level changes and Emin is a privacy level independent bias. For this
study, we use a simplified model with c = 1 and Emin = 0.
5.2 Cost Model for Privacy at Risk.
Let, Eparε0 (ε, γ) be the compensation that a business entity has to pay to every stakeholder
in case of a personal data breach when the data is processed with an ε0-differentially private
privacy-preserving mechanism along with a probabilistic quantification of privacy level. Use
of such a quantification allows use to provide a stronger a stronger privacy guarantee viz.
ε < ε0 for a specified privacy at risk at most γ for Thus, we calculate E
par
ε0 using Equation 9.
Eparε0 (ε, γ) , γE
dp
ε + (1− γ)Edpε0 (9)
5.2.1 Existence of Minimum Compensation Budget.
We want to find the privacy level, say εmin, that yields the lowest compensation budget.
We do that by minimising Equation 9 with respect to ε.
Lemma 14 Eparε0 (ε, γ) is a convex function of ε.
By Lemma 14, there exists a unique εmin that minimises the compensation budget for
a specified parametrisation, say ε0. Since the risk γ in Equation 9 is itself a function of
privacy level ε, analytical calculation of εmin is not possible in the most general case. When
the output of the query is a real number, we derive the analytic form (Equation 4) to
compute the risk under the consideration of explicit randomness. In such a case, εmin is
calculated by differentiating Equation 9 with respect to ε and equating it to zero. It gives
us Equation 10 that we solve using any root finding technique such as Newton-Raphson
method Press (2007) to compute εmin.
1
ε
− ln
(
1− 1− e
ε
ε2
)
=
1
ε0
(10)
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5.2.2 Fine-tuning Privacy at Risk.
For a fixed budget, say B, re-arrangement of Equation 9 gives us an upper bound on the
privacy level ε. We use the cost model with c = 1 and Emin = 0 to derive the upper bound.
If we have a maximum permissible expected mean absolute error T , we use Equation 12
to obtain a lower bound on the privacy at risk level. Equation 11 illustrates the upper
and lower bounds that dictate the permissible range of ε that a data publisher can promise
depending on the budget and the permissible error constraints.
1
T
≤ ε ≤
[
ln
(
γE
B − (1− γ)Edpε0
)]−1
(11)
Thus, the privacy level is constrained by the effectiveness requirement from below and
by the monetary budget from above. Hsu et al. (2014) calculate upper and lower bound
on the privacy level in the differential privacy. They use a different cost model owing to
the scenario of research study that compensates its participants for their data and releases
the results in a differentially private manner. Their cost model is different than our GDPR
inspired modelling.
5.3 Illustration
Suppose that the health centre in a university that complies to GDPR publishes statistics
of its staff health checkup, such as obesity statistics, twice in a year. In January 2018, the
health centre publishes that 34 out of 99 faculty members suffer from obesity. In July 2018,
the health centre publishes that 35 out of 100 faculty members suffer from obesity. An
intruder, perhaps an analyst working for an insurance company, checks the staff listings in
January 2018 and July 2018, which are publicly available on website of the university. The
intruder does not find any change other than the recruitment of John Doe in April 2018.
Thus, with high probability, the intruder deduces that John Doe suffers from obesity. In
order to avoid such a privacy breach, the health centre decides to publish the results using
the Laplace mechanism. In this case, the Laplace mechanism operates on the count query.
In order to control the amount of noise, the health centre needs to appropriately set the
privacy level. Suppose that the health centre decides to use the expected mean absolute
error, defined in Equation 12, as the measure of effectiveness for the Laplace mechanism.
E
[|L1ε(x)− f(x)|] = 1ε (12)
Equation 12 makes use of the fact that the sensitivity of the count query is one. Suppose
that the health centre requires the expected mean absolute error of at most two in order to
maintain the quality of the published statistics. In this case, the privacy level has to be at
least 0.5.
In order to compute the budget, the health centre requires an estimate of E. Moriarty
et al. Moriarty et al. (2012) show that the incremental cost of premiums for the health
insurance with morbid obesity ranges between $5467 to $5530. With reference to this
research, the health centre takes $5500 as an estimate of E. For the staff size of 100 and
the privacy level 0.5, the health centre uses Equation 8 in its simplified setting to compute
the total budget of $74434.40.
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Figure 4: Variation in the budget for Laplace mechanism L1ε0 under privacy at risk consid-
ering explicit randomness in the Laplace mechanism for the illustration in Section 5.3.
Is it possible to reduce this budget without degrading the effectiveness of the Laplace
mechanism? We show that it is possible by fine-tuning the Laplace mechanism. Under
the consideration of the explicit randomness introduced by the Laplace noise distribution,
we show that ε0-differentially private Laplace mechanism also satisfies ε-differential privacy
with risk γ, which is computed using the formula in Theorem 10. Fine-tuning allows us to
get a stronger privacy guarantee, ε < ε0 that requires a smaller budget. In Figure 4, we
plot the budget for various privacy levels. We observe that the privacy level 0.274, which
is same as εmin computed by solving Equation 10, yields the lowest compensation budget
of $37805.86. Thus, by using privacy at risk, the health centre is able to save $36628.532
without sacrificing the quality of the published results.
5.4 Cost Model and the Composition of Laplace Mechanisms
Convexity of the proposed cost function enables us to estimate the optimal value of the
privacy at risk level. We use the optimal privacy value to provide tighter bounds on the
composition of Laplace mechanism. In Figure 5, we compare the privacy guarantees ob-
tained by using basic composition theorem Dwork et al. (2014), advanced composition theo-
rem Dwork et al. (2014) and the composition theorem for privacy at risk. We comparatively
14
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Figure 5: Comparing the privacy guarantee obtained by basic composition and advanced
composition Dwork et al. (2014) with the composition obtained using optimal privacy at
risk that minimises the cost of Laplace mechanism L1ε0 . For the evaluation, we set δ = 10−5.
evaluate them for composition of Laplace mechanisms with privacy levels 0.1, 0.5 and 1.0.
We compute the privacy level after composition by setting δ to 10−5.
We observe that the use of optimal privacy at risk provided significantly stronger privacy
guarantees as compared to the conventional composition theorems. Advanced composition
theorem is known to provide stronger privacy guarantees for mechanism with smaller εs. As
we observe in Figure 5c and Figure 5b, the composition provides strictly stronger privacy
guarantees than basic composition, in the cases where the advanced composition fails.
6. Related Work
Calibration of mechanisms. Researchers have proposed different privacy-preserving
mechanisms to make different queries differentially private. These mechanisms can be
broadly classified into two categories. In one category, the mechanisms explicitly add cali-
brated noise, such as Laplace noise in the work of Dwork et al. (2006c) or Gaussian noise
in the work of Dwork et al. (2014), to the outputs of the query. In the other category,
Chaudhuri et al. (2011); Zhang et al. (2012); Acs et al. (2012); Hall et al. (2013) propose
mechanisms that alter the query function so that the modified function satisfies differ-
entially privacy. Privacy-preserving mechanisms in both of these categories perturb the
original output of the query and make it difficult for a malicious data analyst to recover
the original output of the query. These mechanisms induce randomness using the explicit
noise distribution. Calibration of these mechanisms require the knowledge of the sensitivity
of the query. Nissim et al. Nissim et al. (2007) consider the implicit randomness in the
data-generation distribution to compute an estimate of the sensitivity. The authors pro-
pose the smooth sensitivity function that is an envelope over the local sensitivities for all
individual datasets. Local sensitivity of a dataset is the maximum change in the value of the
query over all of its neighboring datasets. In general, it is not easy to analytically estimate
the smooth sensitivity function for a general query. Rubinstein et al. Rubinstein and Alda`
(2017) also study the inherent randomness in the data-generation algorithm. They do not
use the local sensitivity. We adopt their approach of sampling the sensitivity from the em-
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pirical distribution of the sensitivity. They use order statistics to choose a particular value
of the sensitivity. We use the risk, which provides a mediation tool for business entities to
assess the actual business risks, on the sensitivity distribution to estimate the sensitivity.
Refinements of differential privacy. In order to account for both sources of ran-
domness, refinements of ε-differential privacy are proposed in order to bound the proba-
bility of occurrence of worst case scenarios. Machanavajjhala et al. Machanavajjhala et al.
(2008) propose probabilistic differential privacy that considers upper bounds of the worst
case privacy loss for corresponding confidence levels on the noise distribution. Definition
of probabilistic differential privacy incorporates the explicit randomness induced by the
noise distribution and bounds the probability over the space of noisy outputs to satisfy the
ε-differential privacy definition. Dwork et al. Dwork and Rothblum (2016) propose Con-
centrated differential privacy that considers the expected values of the privacy loss random
variables for the corresponding. Definition of concentrated differential privacy incorporates
the explicit randomness induced by the noise distribution but considering only the expected
value of privacy loss satisfying ε-differential privacy definition instead of using the confidence
levels limits its scope.
Hall et al. Hall et al. (2013) propose random differential privacy that considers the
privacy loss for corresponding confidence levels on the implicit randomness in the data-
generation distribution. Definition of random differential privacy incorporates the implicit
randomness induced by the data-generation distribution and bounds the probability over the
space of datasets generated from the given distribution to satisfy the ε-differential privacy
definition. Dwork et al. Dwork et al. (2006a) define approximate differential privacy by
adding a constant bias to the privacy guarantee provided by the differential privacy. It is
not a probabilistic refinement of the differential privacy.
Around the same time of our work, Triastcyn et al. Triastcyn and Faltings (2019) inde-
pendently propose Bayesian differential privacy that takes into account both of the sources
of randomness. Despite this similarity, our works differ in multiple dimensions. Firstly, they
have shown the reduction of their definition to a variant of Renyi differential privacy that de-
pends on the data-generation distribution. Secondly, they rely on the moment accountant
for the composition of the mechanisms. Lastly, they do not provide a finer case-by-case
analysis of the source of randomness, which leads to analytical solutions for the privacy
guarantee.
Kifer et al. Kifer and Machanavajjhala (2012) define Pufferfish privacy framework, and
its variant by Bassily et al. Bassily et al. (2013), that considers randomness due to data-
generation distribution as well as noise distribution. Despite the generality of their ap-
proach, the framework relies on the domain expert to define a set of secrets that they want
to protect.
Composition theorem. Recently proposed technique of themoment accountant Abadi et al.
(2016) has become the state-of-the-art of composing mechanisms in the area of privacy-
preserving machine learning. Abadi et al. show that the moment accountant provides much
strong privacy guarantees than the conventional composition mechanisms. It works by keep-
ing track of various moments of privacy loss random variable and use the bounds on them
to provide privacy guarantees. The moment accountant requires access to data-generation
distribution to compute the bounds on the moment. Hence, the privacy guarantees are
specific to the dataset.
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Cost models. Ghosh and Roth (2015); Chen et al. (2016) propose game theoretic
methods that provide the means to evaluate the monetary cost of differential privacy. Our
approach is inspired by the approach in the work of Hsu et al. Hsu et al. (2014). They model
the cost under a scenario of a research study wherein the participants are reimbursed for
their participation. Our cost modelling is driven by the scenario of securing a compensation
budget in compliance with GDPR. Our requirement differs from the requirements for the
scenario in their work. In our case, there is no monetary incentive for participants to share
their data.
7. Conclusion and Future Works
In this paper, we provide a means to fine-tune the privacy level of a privacy-preserving
mechanism by analysing various sources of randomness. Such a fine-tuning leads to prob-
abilistic quantification on privacy levels with quantified risks, which we call as privacy at
risk. We also provide composition theorem that leverages privacy at risk. We analytical
calculate privacy at risk for Laplace mechanism. We propose a cost model that bridges the
gap between the privacy level and the compensation budget estimated by a GDPR compli-
ant business entity. Convexity of the cost function ensures existence of unique privacy at
risk that minimises compensation budget. The cost model helps in not only reinforcing the
ease of application in a business setting but also providing stronger privacy guarantees on
the composition of mechanism.
Privacy at risk may be fully analytically computed in cases where the data-generation,
or the sensitivity distribution, the noise distribution and the query are analytically known
and take convenient forms. We are now looking at such convenient but realistic cases.
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Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 10 (Section 4.1)
Although a Laplace mechanism L∆fε induces higher amount of noise on average than a
Laplace mechanism L∆fε0 for ε < ε0, there is a non-zero probability that L∆fε induces noise
commensurate to L∆fε0 . This non-zero probability guides us to calculate the privacy at risk
γ1 for the privacy at risk level ε. In order to get an intuition, we illustrate the calculation
of the overlap between two Laplace distributions as an estimator of similarity between the
two distributions.
Definition 15 [Overlap of Distributions, Papoulis and Pillai (2002)] The overlap, O, be-
tween two probability distributions P1, P2 with support X is defined as
O =
∫
X
min[P1(x), P2(x)] dx.
Lemma 16 The overlap O between two probability distributions, Lap(
∆f
ε1
) and Lap(
∆f
ε2
),
such that ε2 ≤ ε1, is given by
O = 1− (exp (−µε2/∆f )− exp (−µε1/∆f )),
where µ =
∆f ln (ε1/ε2)
ε1−ε2
.
Using the result in Lemma 16, we note that the overlap between two distributions with
ε0 = 1 and ε = 0.6 is 0.81. Thus, L∆f0.6 induces noise that is more than 80% times similar
to the noise induced by L∆f1.0 . Therefore, we can loosely say that at least 80% of the times
a Laplace Mechanism L∆f1.0 will provide the same privacy as a Laplace Mechanism L
∆f
0.8 .
Although the overlap between Laplace distributions with different scales offers an insight
into the relationship between different privacy levels, it does not capture the constraint
induced by the sensitivity. For a given query f , the amount of noise required to satisfy
differential privacy is commensurate to the sensitivity of the query. This calibration puts a
constraint on the noise that is required to be induced on a pair of neighbouring datasets.
We state this constraint in Lemma 17, which we further use to prove that the Laplace
Mechanism L∆fε0 satisfies (ε, γ1)-privacy at risk.
Lemma 17 For a Laplace Mechanism L∆fε0 , the difference in the absolute values of noise
induced on a pair of neighbouring datasets is upper bounded by the sensitivity of the query.
Proof Suppose that two neighbouring datasets x and y are given input to a numeric query
f : D → Rk. For any output z ∈ Rk of the Laplace Mechanism L∆fε0 ,
k∑
i=1
(|f(yi)− zi| − |f(xi)− zi|) ≤
k∑
i=1
(|f(xi)− f(yi)|)
≤ ∆f .
We use triangular inequality in the first step and Definition 2 of sensitivity in the second
step.
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We write Exp(b) to denote a random variable sampled from an exponential distribution
with scale b > 0. We write Gamma(k, θ) to denote a random variable sampled from a
gamma distribution with shape k > 0 and scale θ > 0.
Lemma 18 [Papoulis and Pillai (2002)] If a random variable X follows Laplace Distribu-
tion with mean zero and scale b, |X| ∼ Exp(b).
Lemma 19 [Papoulis and Pillai (2002)] If X1, ...,Xn are n i.i.d. random variables each
following the Exponential Distribution with scale b,
∑n
i=1Xi ∼ Gamma(n, b).
Lemma 20 If X1 and X2 are two i.i.d. Gamma(n, θ) random variables, the probability
density function for the random variable T = |X1 −X2|/θ is given by
PT (t;n, θ) =
22−ntn−
1
2Kn− 1
2
(t)
√
2piΓ(n)θ
where Kn− 1
2
is the modified Bessel function of second kind.
Proof Let X1 and X2 be two i.i.d. Gamma(n, θ) random variables. Characteristic function
of a Gamma random variable is given as
φX1(z) = φX2(z) = (1− ιzθ)−n.
Therefore,
φX1−X2(z) = φX1(z)φ
∗
X2(z) =
1
(1 + (zθ)2)n
Probability density function for the random variable X1 −X2 is given by,
PX1−X2(x) =
1
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
e−izxφX1−X2(z)dz
=
21−n|xθ |n−
1
2Kn− 1
2
(|xθ |)√
2piΓ(n)θ
where Kn− 1
2
is the Bessel function of second kind. Let T = |X1−X2θ |. Therefore,
PT (t;n, θ) =
21−ntn−
1
2Kn− 1
2
(t)
√
2piΓ(n)θ
We use Mathematica Inc. to solve the above integral.
Lemma 21 If X1 and X2 are two i.i.d. Gamma(n, θ) random variables and |X1−X2| ≤M ,
then T ′ = |X1 −X2|/θ follows the distribution with probability density function:
PT ′(t;n, θ,M) =
PT (t
′;n, θ)
PT (T ≤M) ,
where PT is the probability density function of defined in Lemma 20.
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Lemma 22 For Laplace Mechanism L∆fε0 with query f : D → Rk and for any output
Z ⊆ Range(L∆fε0 ), ε ≤ ε0,
γ1 , P
[
ln
∣∣∣∣∣P(L
∆f
ε0 (x) ∈ Z)
P(L∆fε0 (y) ∈ Z)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε
]
=
P(T ≤ ε)
P(T ≤ ε0) ,
where T follows the distribution in Lemma 20, PT (t; k,
∆f
ε0
).
Proof Let, x ∈ D and y ∈ D be two datasets such that x ∼ y. Let f : D → Rk be some
numeric query. Let Px(z) and Py(z) denote the probabilities of getting the output z for
Laplace mechanisms L∆fε0 (x) and L∆fε0 (y) respectively. For any point z ∈ Rk and ε 6= 0,
Px(z)
Py(z)
=
k∏
i=1
exp
(
−ε0|f(xi)−zi|
∆f
)
exp
(
−ε0|f(yi)−zi|
∆f
)
=
k∏
i=1
exp
(
ε0(|f(yi)− zi| − |f(xi)− zi|)
∆f
)
= exp
(
ε
[
ε0
∑k
i=1(|f(yi)− zi| − |f(xi)− zi|)
ε∆f
])
. (13)
By Definition 4,
(f(x)− z), (f(y)− z) ∼ Lap(∆f/ε0). (14)
Application of Lemma 18 and Lemma 19 yields,
k∑
i=1
(|f(xi)− zi|) ∼ Gamma(k,∆f/ε0). (15)
Using Equations 14, 15, and Lemma 17, 21, we get
(
ε0
∆f
k∑
i=1
|(|f(yi)− z| − |f(xi)− z|)|
)
∼ PT ′(t; k,∆f/ε0,∆f ). (16)
since,
∑k
i=1 |(|f(yi)− z| − |f(xi)− z|)| ≤ ∆f . Therefore,
P
([
ε0
∆f
k∑
i=1
|(|f(yi)− z| − |f(xi)− z|)|
]
≤ ε
)
=
P(T ≤ ε)
P(T ≤ ε0) , (17)
where T follows the distribution in Lemma 20. We use Mathematica Inc. to analytically
compute,
P(T ≤ x) ∝
(
1F2(
1
2
;
3
2
− k, 3
2
;
x2
4
)
√
pi4kx]
)
−
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(
21F2(k;
1
2
+ k, k + 1;
x2
4
)x2kΓ(k)
)
where 1F2 is the regularised generalised hypergeometric function as defined in Askey and Daalhuis
(2010). From Equation 13 and 17,
P
[
ln
∣∣∣∣∣P(L
∆f
ε0 (x) ∈ S)
P(L∆fε0 (y) ∈ S)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε
]
=
P(T ≤ ε)
P(T ≤ ε0) .
This completes the proof of Theorem 10.
Corollary 23 Laplace Mechanism L∆fε0 with f : D → Rk is (ε, δ)-probabilistically differen-
tially private where
δ =
{
1− P(T≤ε)
P(T≤ε0)
ε ≤ ε0
0 ε > ε0
and T follows BesselK(k,∆f/ε0).
Appendix B. Proof of Theorem 11 (Section 4.2)
Proof Let, x and y be any two neighbouring datasets sampled from the data generating
distribution G. Let, ∆Sf be the sampled sensitivity for query f : D → Rk. Let, Px(z) and
Py(z) denote the probabilities of getting the output z for Laplace mechanisms L
∆Sf
ε (x) and
L∆Sfε (y) respectively. For any point z ∈ Rk and ε 6= 0,
Px(z)
Py(z)
=
k∏
i=1
exp
(
−ε|f(xi)−zi|
∆Sf
)
exp
(
−ε|f(yi)−zi|
∆Sf
)
= exp
(
ε
∑k
i=1(|f(yi)− zi| − |f(xi)− zi|)
∆Sf
)
≤ exp
(
ε
∑k
i=1 |f(yi)− f(xi)|
∆Sf
)
= exp
(
ε‖f(y)− f(x)‖1
∆Sf
)
(18)
We used triangle inequality in the penultimate step.
Using the trick in the work of Rubinstein and Alda` (2017), we define following events.
Let, B
∆Sf denotes the set of pairs neighbouring dataset sampled from G for which the sen-
sitivity random variable is upper bounded by ∆Sf . Let, C
∆Sf
ρ denotes the set of sensitivity
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random variable values for which Fn deviates from the unknown cumulative distribution of
S, F , at most by the accuracy value ρ. These events are defined in Equation 19.
B
∆Sf , {x, y ∼ G such that ‖f(y)− f(x)‖1 ≤ ∆Sf }
C
∆Sf
ρ ,
{
sup
∆
|FnS (∆)− FS(∆)| ≤ ρ
}
(19)
P(B
∆Sf ) = P(B
∆Sf |C∆Sfρ )P(C
∆Sf
ρ ) (20)
+ P(B
∆Sf |Cρ∆Sf )P(C∆Sfρ )
≥ P(B∆Sf |C∆Sfρ )P(C
∆Sf
ρ )
= Fn(∆Sf )P(C
∆Sf
ρ )
≥ γ2 · (1 − 2e−2ρ2n) (21)
In the last step, we use the definition of the sampled sensitivity to get the value of the
first term. The last term is obtained using DKW-inequality, as defined in Massart et al.
(1990), where the n denotes the number of samples used to build empirical distribution of
the sensitivity, Fn.
From Equation 18, we understand that if ‖f(y) − f(x)‖1 is less than or equals to the
sampled sensitivity then the Laplace mechanism L∆Sfε satisfies ε-differential privacy. Equa-
tion 21 provides the lower bound on the probability of the event ‖f(y) − f(x)‖1 ≤ ∆Sf .
Thus, combining Equation 18 and Equation 21 completes the proof.
Appendix C. Proof of Theorem 13 (Section 4.3)
Proof of Theorem 13 builds upon the ideas from the proofs for the rest of the two cases. In
addition to the events defined in Equation 19, we define an additional event A
∆Sf
ε0 , defined
in Equation 22, as a set of outputs of Laplace mechanism L∆Sfε0 that satisfy the constraint
of ε-differential privacy for a specified privacy at risk level ε.
A
∆Sf
ε0 ,

z ∼ L∆Sfε0 : ln
∣∣∣∣∣∣
L∆Sfε0 (x)
L∆Sfε0 (y)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε, x, y ∼ G

 (22)
Corollary 24
P(A
∆Sf
ε0 |B∆Sf ) =
P(T ≤ ε)
P(T ≤ ηε0)
where T follows the distribution PT (t;∆Sf /ε0) in Lemma 20 and η =
∆f
∆Sf
.
Proof We provide the sketch of the proof. Proof follows from the proof of Lemma 22.
For a Laplace mechanism calibrated with the sampled sensitivity ∆Sf and privacy level ε0,
Equation 16 translates to,
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(
ε0
∆Sf
k∑
i=1
|(|f(yi)− z| − |f(xi)− z|)|
)
∼
PT ′(t; k,∆Sf /ε0,∆Sf ).
since,
∑k
i=1 |(|f(yi)− z| − |f(xi)− z|)| ≤ ∆f . Using Lemma 21 and Equation 17,
P(A
∆Sf
ε0 ) =
P(T ≤ ε)
P(T ≤ ηε0)
where T follows the distribution PT (t;∆Sf /ε0) and η =
∆f
∆Sf
.
For this case, we do not assume the knowledge of the sensitivity of the query. Using
the empirical estimation presented in Section 4.2, if we choose the sampled sensitivity for
privacy at risk γ2 = 1, we obtain an approximation for η.
Lemma 25 For a given value of accuracy parameter ρ,
∆f
∆∗Sf
= 1 +O
(
ρ
∆∗Sf
)
where ∆∗Sf = F
−1
n (1). O
(
ρ
∆∗
Sf
)
denotes order of ρ∆∗
Sf
, i.e., O
(
ρ
∆∗
Sf
)
= k ρ∆∗
Sf
for some
k ≥ 1.
Proof For a given value of accuracy parameter ρ and any ∆ > 0,
Fn(∆)− F (∆) ≤ ρ
Since above inequality is true for any value of ∆, let ∆ = F−1(1). Therefore,
Fn(F
−1(1))− F (F−1(1)) ≤ ρ
Fn(F
−1(1)) ≤ 1 + ρ (23)
Since a cumulative distribution function is 1-Lipschitz [Papoulis and Pillai (2002)],
|Fn(F−1n (1)) − Fn(F−1(1))| ≤ |F−1n (1) − F−1(1)|
|Fn(F−1n (1)) − Fn(F−1(1))| ≤ |∆∗Sf −∆f |
ρ ≤ ∆f −∆∗Sf
1 +
ρ
∆∗Sf
≤ ∆f
∆∗Sf
where we used result from Equation 23 in step 3. Introducing O
(
ρ
∆∗
Sf
)
completes the
proof.
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Lemma 26 For Laplace Mechanism L∆Sfε0 with sampled sensitivity ∆Sf of a query f : D →
R
k and for any Z ⊆ Range(L∆Sfε ),
P
[
ln
∣∣∣∣P(Lε0(x) ∈ Z)P(Lε0(y) ∈ Z)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε
]
≥ P(T ≤ ε)
P(T ≤ ηε0)γ2(1− 2e
−2ρ2n)
where n is the number of samples used to find sampled sensitivity, ρ ∈ [0, 1] is a accuracy
parameter and η =
∆f
∆Sf
. The outer probability is calculated with respect to support of the
data-generation distribution G.
Proof The proof follows from the proof of Lemma 22 and Lemma 26. Consider,
P(A
∆Sf
ε0 ) ≥ P(A
∆Sf
ε0 |B∆Sf )P(B∆Sf |C
∆Sf
ρ )P(C
∆Sf
ρ )
≥ P(T ≤ ε)
P(T ≤ ηε0) · γ2 · (1− 2e
−2ρ2n) (24)
The first term in the final step of Equation 24 follows from the result in Corollary 24 where
T follows BesselK(k,
∆Sf
ε0
). It is the probability with which the Laplace mechanism L∆Sfε0
satisfies ε-differential privacy for a given value of sampled sensitivity.
Probability of occurrence of event A
∆Sf
ε0 calculated by accounting for both explicit and
implicit sources of randomness gives the risk for privacy level ε. Thus, the proof of Lemma 26
completes the proof for Theorem 13.
Comparing the equations in Theorem 13 and Lemma 26, we observe that
γ3 ,
P(T ≤ ε)
P(T ≤ ηε0) · γ2 (25)
The privacy at risk, as defined in Equation 25, is free from the term that accounts for the
accuracy of sampled estimate. If we know cumulative distribution of the sensitivity, we do
not suffer from the uncertainty of introduced by sampling from the empirical distribution.
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